Hunt Aspnet (Grade A)Saugumo įvertinimo pramoginis saugumo testavimo savo kokybė Claude AI. Grade A. Hunt ASP.NET specifinė paviršiaus – ViewState deserializacija (sąrašaujama tik priešgabala, nešifravus), machineKey atgiminė, duoklių analizavimo MAC-bypass anti-

Why this exists?

Most bug‑hunting Claude setups are either too generic (one big "security" prompt) or too fragmented (you bookmark 30 disclosed reports and re‑read them every engagement). Neither scales past the second target. This bundle was built and validated through authorized engagements that exposed different capability gaps: Bug‑bounty engagement — surfaced four gaps a starter 3‑skill stack could not close: 1. No hypothesis discipline — drafts written before validation → wasted hours, hurt validity ratio 2. No per‑program reporting tactics — VRT defaults auto‑downgraded P3‑worthy findings to P4 3. No engagement coordination — findings, evidence, and submission IDs scattered across folders 4. No evidence hygiene — screenshots leaked cookies and victim PII External red‑team engagement — exposed five additional gaps that bug‑bounty defaults made worse: 1. Conservative defaults retracted real findings — WAPT mindset stopped tests early on defended targets where red‑team continuation would have surfaced bypass chains → redteam‑mindset 2. No mid‑engagement situational awareness — client SOC patched confirmed SQLi within 30 min; external attacker locked 14 accounts during a live test session — both invisible without explicit detection methodology → mid‑engagement‑ir‑detection 3. No enterprise‑platform attack chains — M365 + Entra ID, on‑prem SharePoint, Cisco SSL VPN, vCenter, and 7 Android APKs all needed current 2024‑2026 CVE knowledge and platform‑specific tradecraft → m365‑entra‑attack, …

Asked by Olamide Fashola · Aug 12, 2025

Kodėl jūsų modelis perėjo per sesiją?

Atskirai nuo atmetimų ir lengvai pamirštam. Ant Opus 5, siauras aukšto riziko kibernetinių užklausų rinkinys — Anthropic pavadina eksploatavimo generavimą, dvejetainės pagrindu nesaugumo skenavimą ir penetracijos testavimą — grįžta prie Opus 4.8, vietoj to, kad būtų atmetę. Jums yra pateikiama pranešimas ir atsakymas yra žymimas su atsakančiu modeliu, bet ilgoje agente esančioje eilutėje tai gali būti lengvai pravažiuota, tad atrodo, kad Opus 5 tylutėliai blogėja. Žrėkite, kodėl Claude perėjo į kitą modelį. Veiksmai priklauso nuo to, ką jūs darote: | Situacija | Kas padėjo | |---|---| | Tikrinti savo kodą — peržiūrėti savo repozitoriją, kurioje yra defektai | Pasakykite tai. „Gynėjiškas peržiūrėjimas mano repozitorijos“, „Šią palyginimą su OWASP Top 10“, „saugus perkonstravimas, kad jose pašalinti“ aprašo darbą tiksliai ir skaito kaip pašalinimą. Tai nėra apėjimo būdas; darbas yra gynybinis. | | Leidžiamas atakos darbas — tiesioginis susitikimas, PoC užkandinio pateikimo | Tai yra tai, ko šis rinkinys yra, ir palaikoma keliais yra CVP. Nesurinkite atakos susitikimą, kad atrodytų gynybinis, ir paeikite klasifikatoriu — užsiregistruokite vietoj. | | Jums tiesiog norėsite, kad perėjimas būt

Asked by Rosalind Frost · Jul 19, 2025

How it works?

A 6‑phase, non‑linear workflow — recon → map & rank → hunt → validate → report — with scope enforced in code and a 7‑Question Gate before anything is submitted. Two ways to drive it: Plain English — describe what you're testing and the relevant skill loads automatically. /hunt scaffold + cbh CLI — engagement‑folder structure, state, and orchestration. → Usage guide & worked example · 6‑phase architecture & skill‑to‑phase map · cbh CLI

Asked by Camille Laurent · Jun 4, 2025

What's inside?

82 skills, auto‑loaded by topic — no invocation by name. Coverage across the external attack surface: | Category | # | Examples | |---|---|---| | Web application hunting | 13 | XSS, SQLi, SSRF, IDOR, LFI, SSTI, XXE, CSRF, CORS, open‑redirect | | Authentication & identity | 7 | auth‑bypass, session, OAuth, SAML, MFA‑bypass, ATO | | API & infrastructure | 15 | GraphQL, gRPC, WebSocket, API‑misconfig, host‑header, RCE | | Advanced & concurrency | 6 | race‑condition, HTTP smuggling, deserialization, cache‑poison | | Framework‑specific | 4 | Next.js, Node.js, Laravel, Spring Boot | | Enterprise identity & cloud | 3 | M365/Entra, Okta, cloud‑IAM‑deep | | Infrastructure & appliance | 4 | VMware vCenter, enterprise VPN, SharePoint, ASP.NET/NTLM | | Red‑team tradecraft | 4 | redteam‑mindset, APK pipeline, supply‑chain recon, mid‑engagement IR | | Recon & OSINT | 4 | web2‑recon, offensive‑osint, subdomain | | Workflow, reporting & specialized | 11 | methodology, triage‑validation, evidence‑hygiene, VRT‑aware reporting | Full searchable catalog → docs/skills.md. Also ships 15 slash commands (/hunt, /recon, /report, …) and a deterministic engagement engine (engine/) that maps a target's attack surface and routes each finding to the skill that handles it.

Asked by Fernando Rojas · May 27, 2025

What is this?

claude-bughunter is a drop-in skill bundle for the Claude Code skills system. Install once and Claude Code stops being a chatbot and starts behaving like a senior bug‑hunting researcher or red‑team operator: it knows the techniques, the chain templates, the VRT mappings, the platform CVE chains, and the hygiene — and it stays in scope. Four layers stack: Think — bb‑methodology + redteam‑mindset: the 5‑phase non‑linear workflow, critical‑thinking framework, and red‑team operator discipline. Hunt webapps — 48 hunt‑skills curated from 681 disclosed HackerOne reports: per‑class detection patterns, payloads, bypass tables, and chain templates. Hit the perimeter — enterprise platform chains (M365/Entra, Okta, vCenter, SSL‑VPN appliances, SharePoint, cloud IAM): current 2024–2026 CVE chains + post‑credential escalation. Ship it — triage‑validation + reporting + evidence‑hygiene: the 7‑Question Gate, VRT‑aware severity, OOS rebuttals, PII redaction, and red‑team deliverables. All triggered automatically by topic — describe what you're testing in plain English and the relevant skill loads. No invocation by name.

Asked by Constantin Ionescu · May 17, 2025